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The Wall Comes Down

I

n the summer 1961, I was serving
as a COTC officer with the
8 t h Canadian Hussars, part of
Canada's brigade with forces of
the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization in the Federal Republic
of Germany. It was a summer of
political and military tensions.
Warsaw Pact forces were aggressively
carrying out summer manceuvres
close to the West German border on
the Luneburg Heath (where
Montgomery received the German
surrender at the end of the Second
World War) near Hamburg. And,
despite the denials of Walter Ulbricht
in June, construction of the Wall in
the already divided city of Berlin
began in August.
We were to be given a few days'
leave during our summer deployment, and, in common with most of
my friends, I intended to take that
leave in Berlin. I like to think that
desire was driven by a wish to view
history in the making, but it is possible that a peek at the Soviet zone
would have been quickly superceded
by exploration of the more worldly
delights of the fabled Kiirfurstendamm. It was not to be. No doubt
partly to ensure that there would be
no inadvertent incidents to exacerbate
the tension, all recreational and nonessential military travel to Berlin was
cancelled for the duration of my stay.
Fast forward to November 1989.
The Wall had been breached on 10
November, and by happenstance, as
chief of the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service, I was to visit my
German colleagues near Munich the
following week. Our talks naturally
focused on the recent events in Berlin
and what would happen next - anybody's guess is my recollection. In
fact, I think my German counterparts

were as surprised as the rest of us that
the East German regime was crumbling as quickly as it clearly was! But
the most important aspect of this visit
to Pullach was my hosts' invitation to
spend the following weekend in
Berlin, an invitation I accepted with
alacrity.
Twenty-eight years on, I was finally in Berlin. And what an explosion
of images from the roller coaster of
German history lay in store. First
stop, the bridge over the Glienike
Brucke. You've all seen it, either in
films or on the news. It was the traditional crossing point, usually in the
wee hours of a dark and misty morning, when captured intelligence
agents would be exchanged, in fic-

ly emotional moment, full of hope
for the future.
From this emotional high, we
plunged deep into one of the troughs
of Germany's history - the suburb of
Grossen-Wannsee, site of the Wannsee conference where, over a convivial lunch, fifteen senior Nazis plotted and named that most infamous of
actions - the 'Final Solution' of the `
Jewish Question.' The building itself,
large but unexceptional, was empty
and as grey as the waters of the
Wannsee that lapped the shore. I
remember feeling nothing but a profound emptiness and how little I
could say in comment to my hosts.
From there to the courtyard of the
old War Ministry in the Bendler-

Fast forward to November 1989. The Wall
had been breached on 10 November, and by
happenstance I was to visit my German
colleagues near Munich the following week.
Our talks naturally focused on the recent
events in Berlin and what would happen next
- anybody's guess is my recollection
Lion and in reality. What a contrast
was that morning in November
1989. The sun shone as the crowds
came to see the nose-to-tail parade of
shabby little Trabants, uniformly
belching black smoke on their way
across yesterday's forbidden border.
The little cars were met along the
way by young West Berliners - too
young to remember the events that
led to Europe's division for forty
years - giving a carnation to the occupants of each auto. It was an intense-

strasse, now a memorial, where von
Stauffenberg and a few other leaders
in the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler
had been summarily executed that
very night. A dignified setting and a
sober reminder that even at a late
stage there were those who put their
lives on the line to remove the dictator
who was still obsessed with the war's
continuation.
And then, to the Wall itself, down a
road bordered on both sides by the
Wall to an isolated enclave of West
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Jest-Berlin
"Attention - you are now leaving West
Berlin"

Berlin. At this section of the Wall and
its killing ground behind, the East
German guards clearly believed it was
still business as usual. Patrols and dogs
walked this stretch, as if all the cataclysmic developments of the past
week had never happened. All this
was glimpsed through small holes in
the Wall's crumbling concrete.
Chilling.
Downtown then, past Checkpoint
Charlie, that other favourite crossing
point for Le Carre's and Deighten's
characters, and on to the Potsdamer
Platz where we gazed across the Wall
at the low mound under which lay
Hitler's bunker and final refuge.
Here the atmosphere was anything
but business as usual. Rather a holiday atmosphere prevailed, with
crowds of West Berliners walking
and talking, many equipped with

hammers to extract their chunk of the
Wall.
Here the East German guards
seemed more bemused than anything
else. A few shouted half-hearted
warnings to the concrete hunters but
took no further action. Some made
monosyllabic replies to the comments
addressed to them by Western sightseers, but most simply stood atop the
Wall, silent and clearly unsure of what
was happening around them. Mostly
young, it was difficult to match these
youths with those we had just seen
patrolling with their dogs. Or with
the ruthless killers of record, whose
targets (100 plus) are commemorated
with wreaths and plaques at the spots
along the length of the Wall where
they had attempted to cross.
My last image. Walking down the
Ku'damm, past the Kaiser Wilhelm
Gedachtniskirche, that mute symbol
to the horrors of war, in company
with thousands upon thousands of

Berliners from both sides. And, amazingly, to hear voices singing 'The
Battle Hymn of the Republic.' Odd.
That aside, the amazement of the
East Berliners at the unremitting opulence of this jewel of capitalism was
palpable. For example, one could not
even approach the Mercedes showroom for the crowds. And a welcome
for easterners everywhere, fueled by a
handout on crossing of 50 West
German marks. For many, a goodly
portion of the DM 50 was left with
the pub and bar owners of West
Berlin, even though they provided
virtually free drinks to anyone who
could show they came from across the
Wall. For many others, however, our
observation was that perfume and
fresh fruit were high on the shopping
lists.
This most remarkable weekend of
contradictions is perhaps best epitomized by the two performances we
attended. One night we went to the
Volksoper (the real opera house being
in East Berlin) to see Gounod's
`Faust.' On that day in Berlin, who
was the Devil and whose soul was on
the auction block? The second night
we saw a thoroughly incomprehensible German musical involving Pepsi
Cola's European manager, the social
shenanigans of his family, and a full
sized helicopter that arrived on stage a
la Miss Saigon. Go figure.

Reid Morden was director of the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service
from 1987 to 1991 and deputy minister of foreign affairs between 1991
and 1994.
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Ten Years After: Whatever Happened
to the 'German Problem'?
There is no longer a 'German problem' in global terms, although
there are and will always be German problems. What are these
problems, and how might they affect domestic, continental, and
international security?
BY DAVID G. HAGLUND

wo historical events have recently been celebrated:
the 10th anniversary of the breaching of
the Berlin Wall and the dawning of a new
millennium. These are fitting occasions to reflect upon
one of the core security challenges of the past hundred
years, namely the so-called German problem in
international relations. It is not difficult to understand
Germany's central place in European and, by
extension, international security as the 20th century began.
It is, however, difficult to the point of being impossible to
make a claim for exceptional German significance in
global security as the 21st century begins. Today, it might
even be said that what is noteworthy about Germany as a
geopolitical actor is that it is not particularly noteworthy.
Whatever happened to the German problem of yore?
At the start of the 20th century, Germany was one of the
principal 'revisionist' states in a world characterized much
more than today's by rivalry and even power-balancing
competition among several major powers. Moreover, and
most important, it was a discontented power on a continent, Europe, that had yet to learn how to avoid civil war.
Today, Germany is a decidedly status quo state in a world
that has been spared for some decades the less salubrious
aspects of multipolarity.
At the outset, it is necessary to be clear about what is
meant by the German problem in international relations.

T

At the risk of oversimplification, I shall argue that there
have been only two chief ways of interpreting the phenomenon.' The first tends to be the province of specialists
in German politics and history who draw on the crucial
but difficult notion of 'political culture' to generate a set of
hypotheses based upon a belief in German historical, political, and cultural uniqueness. The second group is found
among the international relations theorists who focus far
less on whatever may set the Germans apart as a people (or
as a society), and ask instead what it is about Germany's `
geostrategic' situation, in particular its power and its location, that made it such an important factor in international relations during the past century.
Analysts in the first school tend to argue that Germans singly and collectively - ultimately constitute the nub of
the German problem. Writers in the second school, in contrast, de-emphasize the significance of political culture and
national character - even assuming such could be identified - and focus instead on power, interests, and place in
seeking to come to grips with the problem. The approach
I take here borrows from both, but probably owes more to
the second than to the first school. I would not wish to
Hundreds of Berliners atop the Berlin Wall, demanding that the wall be
pulled down, and carving out chunks of concrete for souvenirs
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claim that 'political culture' is a specious variable; I say
only that it is difficult to operationalize.
It can also be controversial, and usually is, as revealed by
the debate a few years ago over a book published by a
Harvard professor. In Hitler's Willing Executioners:
Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, Daniel Goldhagen
claimed that it was the German national character, steeped
in anti-semitism, more than the German political system (
that is, Nazism) that accounted for the Holocaust. As for
how we should think about Germany and global security
as we enter the 21st century, this variant of the political-

Despite the welter of publications
that followed on the heels of
German unification and were
concerned with the ultimate
meaning of the newer, ostensibly `
stronger,' Germany for European
and international security, it soon
appeared that the real problem
was going to be Germany's
weakness, not its strength.

culture argument offers grounds for concern because it can
lead to the conclusion that Germans are no different now
than they were 60 years ago - or, as one letter to the editor
of the International Herald Tribune put it during the early
stages of the Goldhagen debate, 'there are no compelling
reasons to believe they are not that way today.' The same
writer continued, rather ominously: the 'character of a
nation, like that of an individual, is revealed in adversity.'2
Of course, not all political-culture arguments lead to the
conclusion that Germans are iniquitous and therefore in
need of careful watching; indeed, some claim the opposite,
namely that the identity of Germans has been so altered
that they stand out by dint of their moral superiority. For
example, during the Gulf War the German public initially
defied the Western consensus on the need to resist Saddam
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Hussein's aggression against Kuwait; it counted itself
almost too upstanding to fight. To those analysts, Germans
have had war beaten out of their system (and, to some,
their genes), and, unlike their forbearers, they now bestride
the planet as its pre-eminent pacifists.
If political culture can lead in any number of directions,
analysts in the second camp - who stress power, interests,
and strategic location - can themselves be deeply divided
on the nature of the German problem today. Unlike their
counterparts in the subdiscipline of comparative politics,
theorists of international relations who examine Germany
tend to eschew political-cultural explanations - at least
they try to arrive at answers to their questions with minimal reliance on such explanations. Instead, they
concentrate on 'structural' and other 'institutional' features
of the international environment.' That said, they can be
every bit as disputatious as their comparative politics
cousins, and, on the broad issue of war and peace, the
international relations theorists effortlessly divide
between the pessimists and the optimists. On the
specific issue of Germany and the question of war and
peace, they divide further into those who believe Germany
is too strong (and either celebrate or fret about this) and
those who think it is too weak (and worry or exult
accordingly).
The dominant view today is reasonably optimistic, certainly when put in historical perspective. (Indeed, how
could it not be, in that perspective?) The reasons are varied
and have to do with . both international and domestic
structures or 'systems.' Quite irrespective of whether
Germans are better or worse than any other people, the
optimists believe that Germany cannot adopt a unilateral
approach to its foreign and security problems because the
institutional and societal constraints are simply too vast
and the incentives for multilateralism too abundant.
Germany will not cast aside its established network of
institutional and other ties to its Western neighbours in
favour of a new Sonderweg, or special (and disastrous),
German path.
To the question of Germany's role in international security today, as compared with the past, optimists among the
experts provide two answers. For some, multilateral institutions of a transatlantic and West European nature have
supplied the solution to Germany's age-old security dilemma. German leaders, understanding where their country's
best interests lay, wisely chose the path that would bind
them to Western structures after the catastrophes of two
world wars, and nothing has happened since 1989 to make
them abandon their faith in the country's self-imposed '
cocooning.'

For other optimists, what is truly remarkable today is
not so much the institutional structure of peace; it is rather
the ideational one. In other words, the norms and values of
democracy have become so firmly implanted in the contemporary German socio-political order that it remains
fundamentally impossible for the country ever again to
menace the European or transatlantic status quo.
Germany will have its own interests to pursue, to be sure,
but it will do so through peaceful, 'civilian' means backed
up by confidence in the durability of the 'democratic
peace.'
For the optimists, then, Germany's strength will keep it
peaceful - a strength that inheres both in the country's
international institutional linkages and in its domestic
economic and political arrangements. But pessimists (and
there are some, especially in the ranks of the international
relations theorists) deduce from the assumption of
German strength the opposite conclusion, that a future
challenge to the international security order is well nigh
inevitable. In particular, the breed of theoretician known as
the 'structural realist' sees in the rise of German power evidence that a challenge to American primacy is in the offing.
For structural realists, peace in the long post-World War
ii period was kept by the bipolar international 'structure,'
which organized states into two tightly bound alliances,
Hundreds gather at the Berlin Wall in front of the Brandenburg Gate in
hopes that the East German troops would smash their way through
at this highly symbolic point

possessed of the nuclear wherewithal to preserve an uncertain peace by the prospect of certain annihilation in any
superpower war. Without that bipolarity, one can expect
the future of interstate relations to look like nothing so
much as the pre-1939 era. In the words of a leading structural realist, international relations at that time consisted
of the 'same damn things over and over again: war, great
power security and economic competitions, the rise and
fall of great powers, and the formation and dissolution of
alliances.'5
Despite the welter of publications that followed on the
heels of German unification and were concerned with the
ultimate meaning of the newer, ostensibly 'stronger,'
Germany for European and international security, it soon
appeared that the real problem was going to be Germany's
weakness, not its strength. Images of a 'Fourth Reich' that
characterized much of the debate in 1990 and 1991 soon
gave way to anxiety about whether a new Weimar was in
the making. In contrast both with today's general optimism regarding Germany's security future and with the
initial assumption that unification was going to produce a
stronger Germany, the mood in 1992 and 1993 among
Germany watchers swung sharply toward pessimism, and
for reasons related to internal and external developments.
The principal cause of disquiet in the latter category was
German diplomacy over the disintegrating Yugoslavia,
especially the clumsy attempt to get the Europeans to
extend early recognition to the breakaway republics of
Slovenia and Croatia. But most of the anxiety about
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Germany's future in 1992 and 1993 stemmed from the
domestic front. By late 1992, in the aftermath of
Germany's summer of discontent symbolized by the name
of a Mecklenburg port city, Rostock, it was becoming
harder to sustain the early post-unification thesis that
Germany had become stronger. Instead, analogies were
increasingly drawn between Bonn and Weimar. With an
apparent rise in right-wing ultranationalism, a confused
and at times supine state, and the replaying of all-toofamiliar battles between leftist and rightist extremists in
Germany's streets, all but the most Micawberish students
of the new Germany were evincing concern that occasionally bordered on alarm.
What had gone so wrong, so quickly? To begin with, the
challenge of absorbing and genuinely integrating the old
East Germany was proving far more difficult and costly
than even its strongest proponents could have imagined in
the heady months between the tumbling of the Wall and
the disappearance of the GDR. Now, to that challenge was
added an influx of refugees from further east in Europe that
was larger than that arriving in any other West European
country - in some cases by many orders of magnitude.
As the 'new world disorder' shunted aside the cold war
order, the flood of asylum seekers into Germany intensified: in 1989, 120,000 sought a better life there; in 1990,
nearly 195,000 more came; in 1991, a further 256,000
entered; and in 1992, some 440,000 arrived. For a country
that placed such value on ethnic homogeneity as a social
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East German border guards look through a hole in the Berlin Wall after
demonstrators pulled down a segment

good, and was maintaining at one and the same time a very
liberal asylum policy and a highly restrictive immigration
one, the costs were substantial, and showed up in a
number of widely publicized acts of violence against
asylum seekers and other foreigners that peaked in
1992, when 2,639 such incidents were recorded.
Germany was by no means the only West European
country that had to deal with a rise in social and political
tension associated with increased migratory inflows; in a
sense, it was not even the most xenophobic; polls revealed
that some of its West European partners - France and
Greece, to name two - were more hostile to 'foreigners.'
Nevertheless, for reasons related to its history, its centrality to Europe geographically and economically, and its
potential political and even military power, the events in
Germany seemed to generate greater shockwaves than did
similar anti-foreigner activities elsewhere in Europe. This
led some observers to speculate during the mid-1990s
that the refugee crisis was liable to send the Germans
careering off on another dangerous Sonderweg, fuelled
like the last one in no small measure by an invigorated
nationalism.6
Despite such fears, the refugee crisis did not destabilize
Germany. Notwithstanding the images of skinheads and

other goons running riot through German streets in 1992
and 1993, right-wing extremism has been held in check (
though not eliminated) in the past few years, both in
those streets and at the ballot box. A good part of the explanation for the demise of the extreme right is to be found in
the country's revised asylum policy, which took effect on 1
July 1993. Its legality was upheld by the constitutional
court in Karlsruhe when it ruled in May 1996 that the government was within its rights to exclude from asylum consideration anyone who entered Germany from a 'third
country' that was thought to be a respecter of human
rights or directly from other countries held to be 'safe.' In
practice this has meant that no one could claim asylum if
he or she entered Germany from a bordering state, or from
the non-contiguous members of the European Union, or
from Norway and a host of other third and safe countries.
It is reasonably safe to conclude, with the dark days of
the early 1990s well behind us, that there no longer is a

Federal Republic has known.'' If anything, a case can be
made that the funding scandal carries with it the potential
to move the country further in the direction of reform and
modernization, which should bolster democracy.
The challenge to security lies elsewhere, albeit in such a
way as to emphasize the eternal verity that security and economics are inextricably intertwined. The link between economics and security could be made in a number of ways; not
too long ago, it was common to hear (and to read) that the
threat lurked in the country's high unemployment rate. As
Ethan Kapstein, an early critic of globalization, expressed it,
the 'world may be moving inexorably toward one of those
tragic moments that will lead future historians to ask, why
was nothing done in time?' With undisguised allusions to
Weimar Germany, he continued: 'it is sobering to realize
that Germany's current level of four million unemployed is
the highest it has been since the early 1930s.''
Nor was it just American (and other foreign) writers

And so it is that Germany is struggling to pare back state spending
and restore its economic competitiveness. Herein arises the security
preoccupation associated with today's Germany: the fear that it will be
unwilling or unable (or both) to shoulder its share of the defence
burden on a continent from which war has not been banned and in an
alliance that seems to ache for a 'new transatlantic bargain' ...
`German problem' in international relations. Germany
seems to have become what many a decade ago insisted it
could never be permitted (or allow itself) to become, a 'normal' nation. Germany is a normal nation, but therein lies
the rub: it is 'normal' for states to run into problems that,
unless skilfully managed, can threaten to complicate, if not
undo, their foreign policy. The United States has known
such occasions, and not just once, and so too have lesser
powers like Canada (to say nothing of France or Britain).
So what are the challenges of the early 21st century that
most bear watching, from the perspective of Germany and
international security? To begin with, let us dismiss the likelihood that recently discovered slush funds operated by the
former Christian Democratic government carry the potential to destabilize the country's party system, and therefore
its democracy, and thus constitute, in the alarming words of
one long-time Germany watcher, the 'worst crisis the

who could sound so ominous: the former chancellor,
Helmut Kohl, was a past master at drawing connections
between economic developments (especially those related
to European integration) and the future of European
peace. According to the chancellor, what was at stake in the
early 1990s' drive toward European monetary union was
much more than a common currency. The latter was merely a means, albeit an important one, of melding the myriad nations of (Western) Europe into a federal entity that
would be capable of preserving the peace and prosperity
Europeans have only occasionally known in their long history, even if they have known nothing else in those recent
decades of the cold war dubbed 'the Long Peace.' 'Thus
integration could never be allowed to lose momentum, for
if it did, could disintegration be averted?
As the chancellor saw things (and he was not alone), the
peace and freedom of Europe could not be taken for grant-
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ed even though no great-power threat loomed on the continent. Indeed, the chancellor believed that the primary
security threat to Europe might be Europe itself, that is, its
tendency to relapse into nationalism of a politically
destructive nature. That is why, as he put it on numerous
occasions, the 'politics of integration is really a question of
war and peace in the 21st century.'9
Here, Kohl was simply reiterating what his French
counterpart, Francois Mitterrand, had also argued, most
notably in his address to the European Parliament on 17
January 1995, when he hinted that unless the integration

One never relishes an accusation
of being a deadbeat, and the
government ... will squirm a bit
as a result of that charge ...
but, for the allies who complain
about German underspending on
defence, solace may be found in
the reflection that this is not what
they used to worry about before
they became allies.

of Europe gained momentum and the virus of nationalism
was held in check, the continent would revert to former,
sinister, means of interstate interaction. In case anyone
missed his point, Mitterrand made it plain that 'nationalism means war!"° This is the context in which one had to
contemplate the initial anxiety of European federalists over
European Monetary Union, namely that it might never be
accomplished, with calamitous consequences for the old
continent.
But EMU was accomplished, and if the Euro's drop in
value throughout the year of its introduction (1999) minimized some worries about an impending financial tussle
between 'Euroland' and the United States, it nevertheless
unleashed some other security-related concerns.
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Incredibly, by the end of the decade many saw Germany as
the economic 'sick man' of Western Europe. The oncevaunted German model had stalled, victim it seemed of an
excess of generosity (and not just toward the new Lander in
the east) and a shortfall in productivity, as German companies felt the ever-tightening grip of a vice, the jaws of
which were embossed with 'globalization' and the 'social
safety net.' To continue providing services Germans had
come to take for granted, deficit financing had become the
order of the day. But that technique, as Canada discovered
earlier in the 1990s, can buy only so much time; eventually the piper must be paid.
And so it is that Germany is struggling to pare back state
spending and restore its economic competitiveness.
Herein arises the security preoccupation associated with
today's Germany: the fear that it will be unwilling or
unable (or both) to shoulder its share of the defence
burden on a continent from which war has not been
banned and in an alliance that seems to ache for a 'new
transatlantic bargain' in which (presumably) NATO finds
greater equilibration in the post-Kosovo era through the
West European search for a more robust defence
capability (a European Security and Defence Identity, or
ESDI) within the alliance. All members of the European
Union appear to have convinced themselves that ESDI is a
necessity if they are to continue to experience in the next
half-century anything like the stability and prosperity
West Europeans have known in the past half-century.
The principal challenge for the Germans will inhere in the
evolution of ESDI. If burden sharing increasingly characterizes Western security, and if the Europeans are to be
encouraged and expected to take on more responsibility
for their own security interests - including those that might
be threatened from what used to be called the 'out-of-area'
regions - then it would be logical to assume that Germany
must play a larger role in safeguarding, with force if need
be, the interests of Europe. It is difficult to see how
Germany can be brought easily to accept such responsibility. Not so long ago the problem was thought to be
German constitutional and psychological inhibitions
against the use of force except in the event of an attack on
German territory or the territory of some of Germany's
allies. Certainly the 'Kohl doctrine,' which forbade
German troops from being deployed on terrain once trod
by the Wehrmacht, seemed a constraint on participating in
just the sort of crisis-management activities that currently
give NATO meaning.
But quickly the Kohl doctrine, too, disappeared, so that
Germans are now legitimate partners in policing the

Balkans - even (though to a limited extent) going on
bombing raids against one of those Balkan countries,
Serbia. A decade ago, only a few would have imagined such
a possibility. And while some might see in Germany's exercise of the responsibilities of a 'normal' state a re-emergence of the German problem in international relations,
the truth is, that old menace is dead. The country's security difficulties in the future will be of a more mundane
nature, in some respects not terribly different from those
facing Canada: can it afford to pay for the security it needs?
And though Germany's challenges will continue to tax the
ingenuity of policy-makers, to say nothing of the patience

David G. Haglund is director of the Centre for
International Relations and professor in the Department
of Political Studies at Queen's University. He has held a
visiting professorship in Germany, where he was affiliated
with the German-Canadian Centre at the University of
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Not so long ago the problem was
thought to be German

constitutional and psychological
inhibitions against the use

of force except in the event of an

attack on German territory or the
territory of some of Germany's
allies ... But quickly the Kohl
doctrine, too, disappeared...
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INSIGHT

Micro-credit, poverty and
development: the case of Bangladesh
Very small loans used to encourage entrepreneurs in the Third World are being
hailed by some as a powerful tool in the eradication of poverty. One of the
founders of micro-credit describes what it is doing for the people of Bangladesh.
BY F. H. ABED

has created enorM icro-credit
mous interest among

Micro-credit: definition and use

d e v e l o p ment practitioners and
policy-makers in many parts of the
world. It has also garnered wide
support from aid agencies,
governments, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and the public
at large. Assuming the character of a
movement, it has spread to four continents and even percolated into the
heartland of the USA. In 1997, the
influential New York Times went so far
as to proclaim that microfinance was
the 'much needed revolution in antipoverty programs." Since then, there
has also been a micro-credit summit
`to extol its virtues before the world
leaders and give a call for mobilization
of $20 billion for channeling as small
loans for alleviation of poverty not
only in the Third World but also in
the developed nations where pockets
of poverty exist.'2 According to the
senior vice president and chief economist of the World Bank, cmicrocredit
programs are an effective policy
instrument for reducing poverty
among poor people with the skills to
become self-employed. It also shows
that such programs are more costeffective than other types of
antipoverty program:3

Simply put, micro-credit describes
small loans made to poor households
to finance small-scale entrepreneurial
activities. NGos in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America are the largest
providers of micro-credit to those
sections of society - rural landless,
disadvantaged women, marginal
farmers, and wage labourers - who
depend largely on selling their labour
for a living. In many countries, the
poor have little or no access to
institutional credit because they have
no assets that can be used as
collateral. Micro-credit has emerged
in those countries as a potent
instrument to alleviate poverty and
improve the access of the poor to
financial services. Such credits, which
are otherwise unavailable to the poor
or available only at exorbitant terms
from moneylenders, enable poor
households to undertake productive
economic activities and provide an
opportunity to escape the shackles of
poverty. Against this background,
micro-credit programmes have expanded rapidly in the low-income
countries and have become more than
a poverty reduction strategy. Because
they are attractive to donors, they

have helped many NGO5 to build a
financially sustainable pool of independent working capital.
Micro-credit: some strategic issues
Many countries have established
micro-credit programmes and microfinance institutions (MFIs) over the
last two decades. Their growth in different parts of the world has given rise
to some critical issues and questions:
■ where micro-credit is used and to
what end;
■ whether wider financial services
can be used effectively by the
poor;
■ whether micro-credit is used as a
development strategy and as an
alternative and/or complimentary
strategy;
■ whether credit alone can
address the problems of
poverty, or whether it has to be
accompanied by broader
intervention programmes of
social
development
and
mobilization; and
■ micro-credit's future potential.
Micro-credit, in combination with other social
development programmes, is improving the
living conditions of many of the poor in
Bangladesh

Nick Etheridge
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These issues are discussed with particular reference to the experiences of
Bangladesh where micro-credit has
attained unprecedented growth.
Bangladesh has provided models of
recognized global significance in such
aspects of micro-credit as scale of
operation, modes and practices of
micro-credit, alternative models of
wider financial services, programme
sustainability, and empowerment of
women. Illustrations have largely
been drawn from the Bangladesh
Rural Advancement Committee
(BRAG), one of the largest NGOs in the
world, which has a sizeable microfinance operation.

strategies of the poor, the experience
of Bangladesh has become globally
influential:4
Both public and private sector
organizations are involved with
micro-credit in Bangladesh, but NGOs
have taken the lead. Of the approximately 15,000 registered NGOs in
Bangladesh, nearly 1,000, including
BRAG, provide a large part of the
micro-credit services. Grameen Bank
has received international recognition
for its micro-credit services. Together,
NGOs and Grameen Bank have
enrolled around nine million poor in
their micro-credit programmes. BRAG
alone has organized over 3.3 million
poor, approximately 96 per cent of
Bangladesh
whom are women, into its microcredit programme. The growth of
Bangladesh can be considered the
micro-credit programmes can be seen
birthplace of the current concept of in Table 1.
micro-credit; the NGOs here have rich
Growth of micro-credit has
experience in the field; and Ban- spawned two new institutions to meet
gladesh is regarded as a leader among specific needs. The Palli Karmathose low-income countries that pro- Shahayak Foundation (msF), funded
vide micro-credit. As some interna- by the government and the World
tional commentators have observed: ` Bank, provides credit funds to wis.
while there are numerous models and The Credit and Development Forum (
practices around the world linking
CDF) is a networking NGO that profinancial services to the livelihood
vides need-based training and customized service to its member NGOs.
As NGO programmes expand in
Table 1: Micro-credit in Bangladesh
Bangladesh, so too does micro-credit.
(NGOs and GB) : June 1998
Programmes are expected to triple
over the next seven years, thereby raisMembership
9,511,427
ing the annual disbursement to us$3
billion from the current level of one
Savings of the members
234
billion dollars. The number of bor(million us$)
rowers is expected to reach 12 million.
Some basic information about
Cumulative disbursement
3,038
Bangladesh is provided in this con(million us$)
text.
Source: F H Abed, 'Micro-credit
programme of BRAG: meaningful
cooperation in poverty alleviation';
unpublished paper, 1999
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Bangladesh - some basic facts
Bangladesh, which broke away from
Pakistan in 1971, is the most densely
populated country in the world. With

Table 2: Some basic facts about
Bangladesh

Population (1996)

126 million

Density (population per
su. km)

850

Human Development
Index Rank (1998)

147

Infant mortality (1996)
Adult literacy (1998)

83
51%

GNP per capita (1998) us$ 280
Landlessness

50%

Population in poverty
(below 2,122k
cals/day/person)

47%

Source: UNDP, 1998; UNICEF, 1998;
A.M. R. Chowdhury and A.
Bhuiya, 'Do poverty alleviation programmes reduce inequalities in
health? The Bangladesh experience,'
in Leon and Walt, eds, Poverty
I n e q u a l i t y a n d H e a l t h (Oxford:
Oxford University Press forthcoming).

a per capita gross national product of
us$280, it is also one of the poorest.
Approximately 80 per cent of the
population live in rural areas, and 60
per cent of the labour force depend on
agriculture for their livelihood. Over
half of the population is landless.
Between 1975 and 1993 food production almost doubled, and life
expectancy increased by 30 per cent
between 1970 and 1996. Net enrollment in primary schools has increased
to 77 per cent, and the gender gap has
been considerably reduced.
Despite these impressive strides,
Bangladesh ranks 18th from the bottom among 123 developing coun-

tries, according to the World Bank's
new system of measuring the wealth
of nations (PPP).
In Bangladesh the constitutional
responsibility for development rests
with the government, which has not
always performed to its full potential,
especially true in the area of poverty
alleviation. The War of Liberation in
1971 raised new expectations and
provided fresh impetus to create a just
and poverty-free Bangladesh. The
NGOs, born out of the need for relief
and rehabilitation operations in the
aftermath of war, got involved in this
task and later in the field of development. BRAG is one such organization.
BRAG - from

relief to poverty

alleviation
started its work in 1972 with a
relief and rehabilitation project. In
1973 it shifted its strategies from
addressing the 'acute crisis' of the
aftermath of the war to dealing with
the 'persistent crisis' of development.
Over the years BRAG has grown exponentially in development innovation
and scale. It now works in all parts of
Bangladesh and implements nationwide programmes on poverty alleviation through micro-financing, nonformal primary education, and health
programmes. Its runs over 34,000 primary schools for 1.2 million children.
Seventy per cent of the students are
girls and over 90 per cent of the teachers are women. BRAC's health and
population programme covers around
35 million people. Using villagebased voluntary health workers, it
provides essential health services to
villagers with emphasis on specific
diseases such as tuberculosis and
women's issues such as family planning and nutrition.
BRAC's primary poverty alleviation
effort is its Rural Development
BRAG

Programme (RDP), a multifaceted
programme designed to promote
both social and economic development. The R D P is active in over
50,000 of Bangladesh's 86,000 villages and involves nearly 3.3 million
poor women from as many families.
The twin goals of BRAG, poverty alleviation and empowerment of women,
are reflected in RDP's activities and
strategies.
Impact of micro-credit in
Bangladesh
Micro-credit programmes have had
an impressive impact on reducing
poverty in Bangladesh. The provision
of financial services, skills training,
and targeting mechanisms has translated into big changes for the programme participants. For example, a
variety of skills have been passed on to
the poor participating in BRAC's RDP modern methods of poultry rearing,
cattle rearing, pisciculture, sericulture, vegetable cultivation, plant

nursery, and so on. The technology
diffusion in the poorer households
has helped them to widen their
income earning potential. A study
sponsored by the World Bank has
produced evidence of the wide-ranging impact of micro-credit on the
conditions of borrowers. The study,
which examined programmes of
BRAG, Grameen Bank, and RD-12 of
Bangladesh Rural Development
Board (BRDB), a public sector organization, found that per capita expenditure had increased among the microcredit borrowers in all of these programmes. A household's net worth
also increased. The study clearly indicates that micro-credit reduces both
moderate and extreme poverty,
though at varying rates.'
Another study examined the effect of
micro-credit on poverty, vulnerability, and female empowerment. (
Micro-credit programmes operated
by the NG0s, Grameen Bank and public sector organizations are largely, if
not entirely, targeted at women.)

Table 3: Some basic facts about BRAG: 1999
Full-time staff

24,200

Part-time staff

33,746

Number of districts
64)
with BRAG programme

Amount saved by
us$ 68
village organization million
members
64 (of

Primary schools run 34,517
by BRAG
Students enrolled

Participants in 3.3 million
poverty alleviation
households
programme
Loans disbursed us$ 900
million to the poor
Percentage of loans
repaid
SOURCE: BRAG programme

1.2 million
(70% girls)

Population covered 35 million
in BRAC's health programme
Total budgetus $131 million

98%

records
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Results suggest that micro-credit's
greatest impact is on the set of indicators relating to female control over
assets and knowledge of social issues.6
Other empirical studies have also
come to the conclusion that `microcredit has been found to strengthen
crisis-coping mechanisms, diversify
income-earning sources, build assets
and improve the status of women.''
One study specifically estimates that `
for every 100 taka lent to a woman,
household consumption increases by
18 taka; interestingly the figure is 11
taka if the same amount was lent to a
man.'8 Two other studies have found
that 'a small amount of money works
as a miracle in a cash-hungry society
and significantly raises the woman's
power in the family.'9

In many cases, women participate in
decisions that have to do with household issues. Women in BRAC's microcredit programme have become critically aware of issues relating to dowry,
family and inheritance laws, family
planning, and education of their children.
All of these studies point to three
things: micro-credit's impact on
poverty, its protection against vulnerability, and its empowerment
of women. Nearly half of the
population of Bangladesh still lives
below the poverty line. The women,
particularly those from poor
households, are the most vulnerable
and disadvantaged. Alleviation of
poverty has been accorded
priority. So has the issue of gender
equity and empowerment of

skills, diffusion of new ideas and
technology, and peer consultation
have enabled the poor who
participate in the programme to
use their credit quite effectively.
All micro-credit programmes use
community-based organizations to
ensure the active and direct
participation of borrowers in the
lending process. MFis have used the
group-based approach to enforce
their targeting criteria. This approach
has fostered participation and social
mobilization. In Bangladesh, a chronic problem for commercial banks and
development finance institutions
is the accumulation of large non-performing loans. This has, in turn, created a serious problem in the financial
sector. Micro-credit has helped
to break the legacy of defaulting
on loans.
Micro-credit and modern
technology

Women in Bangladesh, particularly
those in poor households, are the
most disadvantaged group. A large
number of studies on microfinance
and women's empowerment suggest
that the former has had an impact on
the latter. The mobility of the women
outside their home and some control
over their own income have increased.
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women. As a part of the national
development strategy, micro-credit
programmes are playing an important
role in both.
Some people question whether the
poor can use wider financial services
effectively. Micro-credit has helped
capacity development of the poor in
several ways. Training in marketable

Micro-credit has largely been used in
Bangladesh for traditional activities.
Its full potential has, therefore, been
held back by the virtual absence of
modern production technology in
rural areas. BRAG has made a
significant commitment to new
technology in its micro-credit
programme. The technologies
include: high yielding varieties of
birds, vaccination, modern
hatchery, and chick rearing units in
poultry; insemination of livestock;
fish hatchery development; seed multiplication, tissue culture, and the use
of hybrid seeds in crop production;
and improved varieties of mulberry
trees, quality production of cocoons,
and modern reeling facilities for the
sericulture programme. Effective use
of these technologies requires
training, which can substantially
increase productivity and profit
margins. Micro-credit and skills
development training have to go
together. In corn-

bination, they can significantly
increase the effectiveness and productivity of micro-credit programmes.

Micro-credit and social development

CORE PROGRAMMES AND COMPONENTS

RURAL DEVELOPMENT

RURAL DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAMME (RDP)

MFISfollow different approaches in
providing micro-credit. There are
basically three approaches: 'credit
alone,' 'credit plus,' and 'credit with
social development.' In Bangladesh
the four largest MFIS are BRAC,
Proshika, ASA,and Grameen Bank.
The first three are NGOS. BRAC and
Proshika have combined credit with
social development programmes. ASA
is operating a one-dimensional credit
programme. Grameen Bank's programme is also one-dimensional, but
it encourages some social development activities for its borrowers.
Proponents of the credit-alone
approach argue that the poor need
capital; if it is provided in the form of
credit, the poor will be able to take
advantage of some interactive forces
within the economy to improve their
economic condition.
This argument, however, neglects
the fact that many other factors health and education, to name two.are equally important for poverty alleviation. Take health, for example.
Bangladesh is poor by almost all
health indicators - morbidity, malnutrition, access to medical care, and so
on. To focus on the first indicator,
morbidity is associated with the economic status of households: income
erosion as a result of morbidity further impoverishes the poor. A recent
study found that poor households in
Bangladesh, that is, those with a
monthly income of less than taka
1000 (us$~O),
showed a morbidity of
215 per thousand or 35 per cent higher than the morbidity rate for those
earning taka 3,000 or more per
month.1° These findings clearly sug-

Schools

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
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FIGURE 1: BRAC'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES
gest that if micro-credit programmes
are to succeed, they should address
the health needs of the poor.
A group of experts recently concluded that, while credit is obviously
needed for poverty alleviation, it
alone is not enough. Social development is a 'precondition for reahsing
the full potential value of credit and
financial interventions.'" The importance of combining credit with social
development interventions was emphasized at a 1996 workshop in
Dhaka: 'There is an overall preference
... for combining a strategy of wider,
flexible financial services with a recognition that the value of such financial

I

BRAC Health

Centre

Essential Health
Care

Sanitation, safe
water, community
health workers

services can only be secured in a sustainable way by wider forms of intervention in the political economy via
various strategies of social mobilisation and conducive' macro-economic
management.'"
BRAC believes that if problems of
poverty are to be addressed, a microcredit programme has to be accompanied by broader intervention programmes of social development and
mobilization. RDP, which is designed
to deal with poverty alleviation, comprises two broad activity areas - social
development and economic development.

Impact of holistic approach

Micro-credit and the ultra poor

Many experts and professional
researchers have critically examined
the impact of BRAC's holistic
approach. BRAG has, of course, carried out its own assessments. Its
Research and Evaluation Division (
RED) has produced nearly 750
reports on different aspects of BRAG
programmes, including their impact.
One recent study, carried out jointly
by RED and the International Centre
for Diarrhoeal Diseases Research,
Bangladesh (ICDDR,B), looked at the
impact of BRAC's multi-sectoral programmes on a variety of indicators.
It found that BRAG member households spent significantly more on

A criticism of micro-credit is that it
has not reached the poorest of the
poor. The criticism is valid. There is a
segment within the poor who are
worse off than ever. This is the segment that will not take loans because,
with no regular source of income,
they fear they will be unable to pay
the regular instalments on a loan. The
ultra poor are primarily women who
are destitute, widows, or divorcees.
They are less able and less willing to
use credit profitably and to become
self-employed. However, if safety nets
and wage employment are provided,
these women could be attracted to
credit facilities.

Research has shown that micro-credit is more
effective when it is used with other
interventions. Preoccupation with microcredit should not displace social mobilization
and social development programmes

food, which reflected higher calorie
intake, decline in malnutrition, and
increase in the rates of child survival
compared to those not involved in
BRAG programmes. The integration
of credit and non-credit
programmes, that is, the
h o l i s t i c approach, has been
particularly
effective
in
empowering women. The study
concludes: 'Poverty alleviation
programmes focused on women as
implemented by BRAG are effective in
improving well-being, particularly in
the areas of childhood nutrition and
mortality.'
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In 1988, BRAG designed a largescale endeavour that became known
as Income Generation for Vulnerable
Groups Development (IGVGD).
IGVGD, which is supported in various
ways by the government and the World
Food Programme, provides wheat to
the vulnerable women for 18 months.
BRAG provides skills training credits
and other support to these women to
enable them to earn sustainable
income. The Palli Karma Shahayak
Foundation (PKsF), a newly developed
financial institution, provides credit
funding to BRAG and MFIs. Over

922,000 women have graduated from
the IGVGD programme to BRAG'S RDP.
Micro-credit: what's in the future?
Access to financial resources in the
form of collateral free loans has
helped many borrowers of
micro-credit programmes to cross
the poverty line. Some emerging
entrepreneurs are now prepared to
make larger investments in their
enterprises and consequently seek
larger loans than NGOs usually
provide. This emerging aspect of
many micro-credit programmes
calls for new solutions.
BRAG has attempted to address this
situation and to meet the financial
needs of specific groups. One such
attempt is the new Micro Enterprise
Lending and Assistance (MELA) programme for micro entrepreneurs.
MELA's objective is to create employment and increase community income
by providing credit facilities of
between Tk. 20,000 and Tk 200,000 (
us$ 400-4,000) and technical assistance to small and new businesses. The
borrowers in the MELA programme are
the graduates of RDP and other members of rural communities.
Another item on BRAG'S agenda for
the future is a bank. A revitalized
small or medium enterprise would
create millions of jobs for the burgeoning population, including the
poor who enter the job market every
year. A BRAG bank would also provide
financial services to NGOs.
iences gained through microcredit operations can be immensely
useful for operating the MELA and the
bank. Micro-credit programmes have
thus created a new dimension of
financial services in Bangladesh.
Concluding observations
Micro-credit programmes are tools

NOTES

used to address poverty in
low-income countries, tools used by
interested
governments,
development organizations, and
NG0s. Micro-credit has a positive
impact on poverty r e d u c t i o n a n d
in
empowering
women.
Because the ultra poor account
for approximately one-tenth the
population of Bangladesh, there are
too many of them to be covered by
micro-credit programmes. Since the
poorest of the poor cannot be
reached, an obvious question is: to
what extent can micro-credit programmes be effective in poverty
alleviation? Experience tell us that
special programming with sufficient
start-up support can attract many of
the ultra poor towards micro-credit.
BRAG'S IGVGD programme is a case in
point.
Financial intervention alone cannot address all the problems of poverty. Poverty is multi-dimensional.
Reducing poverty requires job cre

ation and an investment in human
and social development to increase
workers' productivity. Research has
shown that micro-credit is more
effective when it is used with other
interventions. Preoccupation with
micro-credit should not displace
social mobilization and social
development programmes. NGO
micro-credit
programmes
in
Bangladesh
have
recently
concentrated on addressing basic
human needs such as food, shelter,
health, sanitation, and education of
those most afflicted by poverty. The
search for programme innovations
and operational strategies must be
ongoing if micro-credit programmes
are to grow and to have an impact.

F.H. Abed is the founder and executive director of BRAC, Dhaka,
Bangladesh
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PERSPECTIVE

Canada's NATO commitment:
Current controversies, past debates,
and future issues
Since the conflict in Kosovo, we can probably expect the familiar debates about
Canada's involvement in NATO to continue, as issues of cost-effectiveness,
democracy, and constructive engagement remain unresolved.
BY ERIKA SIMPSON

Canada has been a cornAlittrtnehough
d member of the
N o r t h Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) since the alliance was
founded in 1949, it has not greeted all
NATO decisions with unalloyed
pleasure, as the recent debate about
enlargement and the controversy over
NATO bombing of Kosovo and Serbia
will attest. And we can probably
expect yet another debate about
Canada's commitment to NATO later
this year because the foreign minister,
Lloyd Axworthy, has promised to
question NATO's continued reliance on
nuclear deterrence. There is also
bound to be future dissension over
whether the Allies should embrace such
countries as Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia in a 'second round of
expansion.' While issues related to
NATO expansion and the war in
Kosovo have dominated the news
lately, it might be useful to stand back
and look at some past debates and
possible future issues around Canada's
NATO involvement since the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the end of the cold
war.

CURRENT CONTROVERSIES

Expansion could be a risky business

In the spring of 1999, before the war
in Kosovo, NATO was preparing a
party in Washington, DC, to mark its
fiftieth anniversary. Celine Dion
would sing, and NATO jet fighters
would fly in formation overhead.
Among the achievements to be celebrated was NATO's expansion from 16
to 19 members as it took in Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic in
the first round of enlargement. But
the black ties and tuxedos were never
unpacked, and the big party was cancelled in favour of a quiet meeting to
discuss what might be done about the
crisis in Kosovo.
Although every political party in
Russia vigorously opposed NATO
expansion, at the last moment,
President Boris Yeltsin backed down.
Nonetheless, the issue raised a great
deal of controversy. Some NATO analysts in the West and in the East saw
expansion as a regression to regional
alliance formations and balance-of

power politics. Some even feared a
return to the politics of containment,
to the focus on military force, to collective defence, and possibly extended
deterrence. Others saw it as a
challenge to current efforts,
under the United Nations (UN) for
example, to co-ordinate security at
lower levels of defence expenditure
and worried lest the expansion of a
regional
collective
defence
organization would be at the expense
of efforts to reform a universal
collective security organization
such as the UN. Still others saw that
expansion could risk another security
dilemma, that efforts to increase NATO
security might lessen Russia's sense
of security and possibly lead to
greater tensions, maybe even to
another arms race in a divided
Europe. Others argued that NATO
expansion would
From left to right: Polish Prime Minister Mr.
Buzek, Czech Prime Minister Mr. Zeman,

Prime Minister Mr. Orban at ceremony to mark
accession of these countries to

NATO
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provide Russian nationalists with
another excuse to turn back the clock
and reverse reforms. Nonetheless,
plans were made to expand.
Now that the first round of expansion has taken place, NATO policymakers must forge a consensus
among 19 allies - NATO officially runs
by consensus, not majority vote - to
decide who will be accepted in the `
second round' of expansion. The
risks that expansion could eventually
lead Russia to move some of its conventional or nuclear arsenal into
defensive positions along a newly
defined border, along a new central
front remain.
On just which countries to invite
into NATO during the second round -

violated article 5 was raised as a salient
point. Article 5 raises other troubling
questions. For instance, if Hungary,
now a NATO ally, were to be drawn
into a war with Romania over
Transylvania, an area over which the
two countries have argued for
centuries, would NATO automatically
be involved? Both countries made a
great effort to patch up their
differences so that they would be
invited into the NATO club. But a few
years or decades from now, if an
armed conflict should occur, as it
has done between two other NATO
allies, Greece and Turkey, would
Canada be left in a quandary about its
article 5 commitment? It is fair to say
that NATO expansion is not entirely
risk-free.

The government announcement in September 1991
that it intended to withdraw all but 1200 troops
from the central front in Germany came as no great
surprise ... It was a different matter when the
minister of finance announced plans to withdraw
Canada's contingent from Europe completely. The
members of the Canadian delegation to NATO were
given only a few hours' notice...
Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia, Romania, or Bulgaria - NATO
policy-makers are ambiguous. Their
ambiguity stems, in part, from concerns about the risk of undermining
the credibility of article 5 of NATO,
which I call the 'three Musketeers'
article because it guarantees that an
attack against one is an attack against
all. This is by far the most important
article in NATO's founding treaty. For
example, during the Kosovo debate,
the fact that technically Serbia's president, Slobodan Milogevi, had not
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The War in Yugoslavia and the
Debate at Home
Most recently, the Canadian government's strong support of NATO actions
in Serbia and Kosovo during the war
seemed to many to be proof of loyalty
to the Alliance. Certainly, the United
States Information Agency saw it that
way.' However, the bombing did provoke substantial public discussion
about the role Canada should take in
NATO's management of the crisis in
Kosovo and Serbia. It also prompted
fears about the nature of Canada's

obligations should the war spill
over into the rest of the Balkans.
During the crisis in Kosovo, concerns
were voiced about whether Canada
should condone bombing a sovereign
country that had not attacked any
member of NATO, and that was technically outside NATO's territory of
responsibility. When CF-18 Canadian
fighter planes were sent to assist with
the aerial bombing of Serbia and
Kosovo, a debate arose over whether
air strikes were necessary or morally
unjustifiable.
Not surprisingly, the possibility of a
ground war in the former Yugoslavia
also incited a great deal of debate
across the country and in the media.
Many radio hot-line shows burned up
the airwaves on the issue of contributing ground forces to Kosovo and the
question of whether Canada should
take in refugees. The Defence
Department housed thousands of
refugees, temporarily, at various
Canadian Forces bases.
Whether the federal cabinet was
internally divided on these questions
is not yet known. Certain comments
by Lloyd Axworthy indicate that he
harboured reservations about unequivocally supporting NATO's actions
in the Balkans.2 Put simply, the war
served to remind Canadians that
NATO membership entails obligations
and commitments that might be difficult to sustain.
NATO

DEBATES SINCE THE END OF THE
COLD WAR

Challenge and Commitment

In 1987, the Progressive Conservative
government of Brian Mulroney published a defence white paper.
Challenge and Commitment (sometimes rather derisively referred to as
the 'coffee table white paper' because
of its many colour photographs)

promised a significant increase in
defence spending, ostensibly because
of the challenge from the Soviet
Union. It also promised to strengthen
Canada's NATO commitments. Specifically, the government intended to
acquire a fleet of 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines at a cost of $10-$12
billion. It wanted to double Canada's
troop strength in Europe and modernize Canadian equipment for highintensity warfare on NATO's central
front. Basically, the government proposed to spend $183 billion on
defence over the next fifteen years. It
was a very expensive package for
countering the primary threat of the
cold war.
A couple of years later, in 1989, the
Conservatives suddenly announced
an abrupt freeze on defence spending. They cut back major capital
expenditures. The nuclear submarines were cancelled along with
new main battle tanks and plans to
deploy a division in Europe. It was
evident to almost everyone that the
nature of the threat from the Soviet
Union had changed. Canada could
no longer devote so much money and
resources toward improving collective defence, particularly through its
NATO commitments.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in
November 1989 and war in the
Persian Gulf in the winter of 1991,
Canadians continued to debate
whether there was any reason for
Canada to retain its NATO commitments. The government spent
approximately $1 billion a year merely to maintain Canadian troops in
Europe - and that did not include the
cost of training, equipping, and supplying the rest of the Armed Forces,
which were also structured primarily
for big-league NATO roles, including
war in Europe.

Canadian Efforts to Promote NACC
and Peacekeeping

The government announcement in
September 1991 that it intended to
withdraw all but 1200 troops from
the central front in Germany came as
no great surprise. The financial savings involved in a gradual withdrawal
were estimated at some $1.2 billion
over five years. It was a different matter when the minister of finance
announced, in February 1992, plans
to withdraw Canada's contingent
from Europe completely. The members of the Canadian delegation to
NATO were given only a few hours'
notice of the change in policy.
Initially, the decision was difficult to
justify, especially since just a few
months before Mulroney had assured
Helmut Kohl, the chancellor of
Germany, that Canada intended to
retain a visible military presence on
European soil. The European allies
and the American military representatives at Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE) sharply criticized the timing of the decision and
the fact that it was taken without
proper consultation with the other

Summit meeting: Bonn declaration stresses that
NATO will

never be the first to use arms

allies.' Canadian delegates to NATO
and SHAPE in Brussels tried to soften
the blow by underscoring Canada's
commitment to European security
through its peacekeeping efforts in
the former Yugoslavia and by
pointing out the significant role
Canada's ambassador to NATO was
playing in establishing the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NAcc)
.4
Mulroney had broached the idea of
associate membership in NATO for former Warsaw Pact nations in 1991.
When this possibility was rejected Britain and France worried about the
security guarantee it entailed - the
Canadian ambassador to NATO set
about devising a form of NATO membership for the east Europeans under
NACC auspices.5

Then there was the claim that
Canada's contribution to the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia was a
renewed contribution to European
security. The claim was assisted by the
high media profile of the commander
of the UN forces, Canada's General
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Lewis Mackenzie. Indeed, it was not
long before Canadians at NATO headquarters received requests from the
other allies, including the Americans,
for more information on peacekeeping. Although high-level representatives from allied countries such as
Britain and Germany still saw
Canada's most valuable contribution
to European security was to retain on
European soil troops ear-marked for
NATO, in the early 1990s it seemed as
if the sudden shift of interest to
peacekeeping might somehow

cement of the troop withdrawal, that
Canada would meet its other commitments to NATO.6
Canada's Continuing Alliance
Commitments
Despite the end of the cold war, many
of Canada's other NATO commitments
remained unchanged after the 1992
announcement. For instance, it could
still dispatch an expeditionary brigade
group, two squadrons of CF-18s, and
an air defence battery to Europe, if
necessary. A Canadian Forces battal-

The challenge for Canada, once again, is to
remain constructively engaged - to chart a safer
course - and to ensure NATO responds costeffectively and responsibly. Canada must remind
the other NATO allies that some arguments,
controversy, debate, and dissension can and
should be expected in what is alleged to be a
democratic relationship
brighten Canada's image at NATO
headquarters.
The general attitude of the
Canadian delegation to NATO was one
of resignation. It was aware that the
Canadian announcement was most
likely a precursor to similar announcements of reductions and cutbacks among the other allies. It was
clear that Canada would remain an
active participant in the North
Atlantic Council, in the hundreds of
committees at NATO and SHAPE, and
in the discussions surrounding the
implementation of the New Strategic
Concept. NATO's secretary-general,
Manfred Woerner, assured the allies
in February 1992, after the announ
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ion was prepared to deploy to Europe
with the Allied Command Europe
(ACE) Mobile Force or the NATO
Composite Force. Canadians continued to serve as part of the NATO
Airborne Early Warning (AEW) system
in Geilenkirchen, Germany, and as
aircrew aboard NATO AEW aircraft.
Canadian destroyers and frigates were
prepared to sail with the Standing
Naval Force Atlantic, while eleven
destroyers and frigates, one supply
ship, three submarines, fourteen longrange patrol aircraft, and twenty-five
helicopters retained their role in
patrolling the North Atlantic as part
of NATO's 'augmentation' forces.
Canada would continue to do its part

to defend the Canada-US region of
NATO, as well as to contribute to the
North American Aerospace Defence
Command (NORAD), which is responsible for the defence of NATO's largest
single land mass. Canada also offered
its allies facilities and territory for military training, such as those at CFB
Goose Bay in Labrador and CFB Shilo
in Manitoba, and the underwater
naval testing range at Nanoose Bay in
British Columbia.
The Conservative government continued to demonstrate its support for
NATO through other means as well.
The portion of the infrastructure
budget at NATO headquarters paid by
Canada, although not widely known,
was viewed at NATO headquarters as a
significant contribution. The government's intention to retain
approximately 650 Canadian
personnel at NATO and SHAPE as
military planners, attaches, and
representatives on the Canadian
delegation was also seen as an
important commitment. The
renewal of a ten-year contract to train
approximately 6,000 German Armed
Forces annually at CFB Shilo and CFB
Goose Bay was described as yet
another example of Canada's
intention to h e l p s t r e n g t h e n t h e
a l l i a n c e . Although aboriginal
residents complained about the
environmental effects of low-flying
jets, and Goose Bay was slated to be
closed because the United States
thought it was too expensive for
training purposes, German and
other NATO planes continued to train
there.
The Chretien Government's
Defence Review
In November 1993, Jean Chretien's
new Liberal government announced a
comprehensive review of Canadian
defence policy, which precipitated
another debate about Canada's NATO
commitments. By February 1994, a

Special Joint Committee of the Senate
and House of Commons was established to initiate consultations and
report to the government. In testimony before the Special Joint Corn-mittee on Canada's Defence Policy, some
policy-makers continued to argue
that NATO had to remain a priority for
both defence and foreign policy
because of new conflicts in the world,
particularly in Europe, the instability
of the Russian leadership, and the
remaining military threat. They
advised the government to ensure
that the country had modern military
equipment and sufficient tri-service
personnel to fulfil the strategic
requirements of deterrence as well as
N A T O ' s New Strategic Concept.
Canada, they argued, must continue
to structure and train its military for
mid-to-high intensity combat operations. They acceded that Canada
should contribute to UN peacekeeping
and peacemaking operations, but
such contributions should remain a
low priority for the Canadian Forces
relative to their general combat capability for defending Canada and its
allies. As some argued, the alternatives
posed a risk to security and stability as
well as to Alliance relations. In their
opinion, NATO was adapting to the
new uncertain environment, and
NATO alone retained the political
coherence and military capabilities to
ensure collective defence and security.'
Others assigned a lower priority to
NATO with the disintegration of the
Soviet military threat and the disappearance of both the Warsaw Pact and
the USSR. They noted the unlikelihood of an attack across Europe's central front and frequently cited the historic inability of military alliances to
combat diffuse threats such as ethnic
conflict, environmental degradation,
and human rights violations. Some
suggested that Canada should de-

emphasize its military commitments
to NATO but retain a diplomatic and
consultative presence in the higher
councils of the Alliance. Alternatively,
many favoured increasing Canada's
foreign aid and its contributions to
UN agencies and operations. There
were also related proposals for new
defence priorities that would emphasize monitoring and surveillance of
Canadian territorial waters and air
space as well as expand the country's
commitment to peacekeeping operations under UN auspices. Rather than
attempt to maintain a general-purpose, combat-capable army, navy, and
air force, there were calls for the
Canadian Forces to be restructured
and retrained to contribute more productively to peacekeeping and the
various initiatives outlined in the
1992 UN Agenda for Peace. In the new
environment, there would be unnecessary risks and expenses in adhering
to the prevailing assumptions, practices, and institutions of the past fifty
years.'
In the midst of this defence review,
the government announced its commitment to the conversion of Canadian
Forces Base Cornwallis in Nova Scotia
into a multinational training centre for
UN and NATO-affiliated personnel. At
the new Lester B. Pearson Canadian
International Peacekeeping Training
Centre, the government would sponsor training for military and civilian
personnel from countries participating
in NATO's Partnership for Peace, as well
as from developing countries under
Canada's Military Training Assistance
Program. This decision provoked yet
more controversy about peacekeeping
training and the advisability of establishing a privatized peacekeeping training centre.
The 1994 Defence White Paper

In December, the Department of

National Defence released The 1994
Defence White Paper, which
announced that Canada would
remain a full and active member of
NATO. The monolithic threat to
Western Europe had disappeared, and
the principal responsibility for
European defence lay with the
Europeans. At the same time, the
government valued the transatlantic
link and recognized that NATO had
made progress in adapting to a postcold war world. The paper noted in
particular those aspects of NATO that
reflected a co-operative approach to
European
security
relations,
including the creation of NACC,
Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the
development of the Combined Joint
Task Force Concept. This perspective
on NATO 'underpinned' the future of
Canada's Alliance commitments. In
the event of a crisis or war in Europe,
the contingency forces Canada maintained for all multilateral operations
would immediately be made available
to NATO. Yet, for the first time, the
Defence Department consistently
referred to Canada's NATO defence
commitments after pointing out the
country's UN obligations. This seemed
to herald a fundamental reordering of
Canada's defence priorities.
The Costs of NATO Enlargement
Predictably, the release of thie 1994
white paper did not end the debate
over the measure and extent of
Canada's NATO commitments.
Gradually some high-level foreign
and defence policy advisers became
concerned about the costs of NATO
enlargement for Canada. Prime
Minister Chretien initially supported
expanding NATO membership from
twelve to sixteen (with Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and
Slovenia being the preferred additons). However, estimates of the costs
of enlargement tended to vary widely,
B T H
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in part because of uncertainty about
how many new members to admit.
Nevertheless, in 1997 many highlevel American officials agreed that
expansion would cost somewhere
between US$27 billion and US$35 billion over the next 13 years.
Behind the scenes, some senior
Canadian policy-makers worried
about the looming costs of expansion
and about the extent to which Canada
should or could support the rebuilding of the defence systems of the new
members. In the weeks prior to ratification of the enlargement decision in
the United States Congress, the State
Department concurred with NATO's
revised assessment that enlargement
could cost only us$1.5 billion rather
than us$27-35 billion. Nonetheless,
these wide variations in estimates
among such reputable analysts as the
United States Congressional Budget
Office, the Pentagon, the State
Department, and NATO headquarters
raised more questions about the measure of Canada's NATO commitments
and whether all estimates might prove
to be too low. Even as NATO opened
the door to the first round of expansion, many Canadians worried about
the potential cost of Canada's NATO
obligations.
FUTURE ISSUES

NATO's Nuclear Strategy and the

Middle Powers Initiative
One issue around which further controversy will undoubtedly swirl is
NATO's reliance on nuclear deterrence
strategy. The NATO summit in
Washington in April 1999 opened
the door to a wide-ranging review of
NATO's nuclear weapons policy.
N A T O ' s New Strategic Concept,
which since 1991 has reaffirmed its
reliance on nuclear weapons, will be
reviewed and re-examined. Pressure
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from the leaders of the Middle
Powers Initiative and the nonnuclear weapon states, particularly
from key policy-makers in Canada,
Germany, Sweden, Norway, and
Japan, may result in a serious review
of the Strategic Concept. In particular, the Middle Powers Initiative,
launched in 1998, could influence
NATO's decision-making regarding its
nuclear commitments and lead to
important and subtle shifts in NATO's
deterrence strategy between 2000
and 2002.
The issue that NATO has promised
to review is of historical and practical, as well as theoretical, interest.
After fifty years of relying upon
nuclear weapons for defence, recent
developments, including the end of
the cold war, present an opportunity
to enter this millennium with a plan
for the abolition of nuclear weapons.
Many distinguished world figures
argue that the risk of retaining
nuclear arsenals in perpetuity far
outweighs any possible benefit
imputed to nuclear deterrence. They
believe that the end of the cold war
created a climate for international
action to eliminate nuclear weapons,
an opportunity that must be exploited quickly or it will be lost. They see
the Middle Powers Initiative as a
bold attempt to encourage NATO
leaders to 'break free from their cold
war mindsets' and move rapidly to a
nuclear weapon-free world.
The Middle Power Initiative was
launched to buttress the grassroots
efforts of hundreds of international
and non-governmental organizations
determined to abolish nuclear
weapons. Canada's Senator Douglas
Roche is the chair of the Middle
Powers Initiative, which includes
other non-nuclear weapon states
such as Germany, Norway, Sweden,
Japan, and Mexico. Whereas NATO's

Strategic Concept has hardly
changed since 1991 on the issue of
relying on nuclear weapons, the
Washington summit communique,
issued on 24 April 1999, commits
NATO to 'review' its strategic policy.
At a news conference on the same
day, Lloyd Axworthy confirmed
NATO's willingness 'to have a review
initiated' of its nuclear weapons policies. Explaining that this was the
thrust of the recommendations in the
report of Canada's Foreign Affairs
Committee, Axworthy added: 'It's a
message that the [Canadian] Prime
Minister took [to] certain NATO leaders ... I think we have now gained an
acknowledgement that such a review
would be appropriate and that there
would be directions to the NATO
Council to start the mechanics of
bringing that about.'9
This gives the non-nuclear
weapon states in NATO, and the 12
abstainers on the New Agenda
Coalition's 1998 resolution at the
UN, an opportunity to press for a
`quality review' rather than a perfunctory one. The Middle Powers
Initiative believes that the NATO
communique strengthens the possibility that appropriate representations can be made to a number of
important countries around the
world. Indeed, it was Canada, in its
official policy statement, that urged
NATO to begin a nuclear weapons
review, and this was carried into the
N A T O summit. Members of ,the
Middle Powers Initiative are expected to press for further changes in
NATO's deterrence strategy in the near
future. Success will depend on
whether a new coalition of leaders
from countries respected by the
nuclear weapon states - especially by
the United States - generates sufficient political momentum and
media attention. (It should be noted

that Canada recently abstained on
crucial nuclear disarmament resolutions put forward by the New
Agenda Coalition at the 1998 and
1999 sessions of the UN First
Committee, and voted against resolutions put forward by China and
Russia to strengthen the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty.)
CONCLUSION

Canada's policy record since the end
of the cold war indicates that it will
remain committed to NATO, but on
somewhat different terms. One seldom reaches a silver or golden
anniversary in any relationship without some doubts and an occasional
shift in terms of commitment. Still,
as many concede, this has been a relatively successful alliance over the last
fifty years. The challenge for Canada,
once again, is to remain constructively engaged - to chart a safer course and to ensure NATO responds costeffectively and responsibly. Canada
must remind the other NATO allies
that some arguments, controversy,
debate, and dissension can and
should be expected in what is alleged
to be a democratic relationship indeed, they may help improve this
long-standing institution.
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REFLECTIONS

Bonn at the centre of the world
Random reminiscences that never find their way into the history books
BY THOMAS DELWORTH

L

n fin de siecle Bonn, the only game

in town changed in the late
1980s from the diplomatic
community's constant complaints
about the boredom of life in the '
small town in Germany,' known
affectionately as Bundesdorf or
Langweiligsburg, to the bewildering
excitement of unification-watching.
Given the speed with which it
happened, the daily challenge for
diplomats and natives alike was to
explain what happened yesterday
before facing the daunting task of
reading the new day's newspaper
headlines. Within an amazingly short
span of time, the basic architecture of
the flawed 'settlement' - if it can be
described as such - that imposed itself
on Europe in 1945 came apart and
opened the way for the two Germanys
to be reunited, thereby setting the history of Europe on a new course.
Throughout the long years of the cold
war when the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) provided a stalwart shield against Eastern encroachments on Western Europe, there were
not many among the Allies who
would have taken issue with the often
unarticulated German dream of a
united Germany: the dream of those
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who believed in the inevitability of
the once-and-future homeland no less
than those who prayed for the disappearance of that agonizingly dangerous dividing line. But, in the end, the
realization of a dream shared by both
romantics and strategic planners
brought with it a lot of surprises - the
most unexpected of which was that it
happened at all.
The process was, most certainly, a
triumph for the West - especially as
not a single shot was fired. Has history another example of such a cataclysmic revolution happening peacefully? But the unexpected reservations
and qualifications and the long-suppressed doubts and challenges that
emerged from the onward rush of
seemingly uncontrollable events were
what made this page - or more accurately, this huge chapter - in the history of our times so fascinating.
A few words about the Stockholm
Security Conference, 1984-6 (the socalled CDE, but more properly CCSBMDE) might be a useful beginning for
these anecdotal reminiscences. The
conference, which began amidst the
unabated tensions of the cold war circumstances that had energized

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's peace
initiative - turned out to be more than
routinely significant because it elicit
ed the first signs of major changes in
Soviet thinking. In the final days of
the conference, rudimentary measures for military inspection and verification, which had eluded Western
arms control negotiations for years,
fell into place quickly in a framework
of confidence-building. Few, if any,
saw the real significance - although
shortly after the conference ended the
chief Soviet negotiator was cautiously
but confidently predicting sweeping
reforms as a result of internal events
in the Soviet state. Delphic to be sure
- but mind-boggling as a refreshing
change from the usual banal Soviet
diplomatic 'confidences' so common
in earlier decades of cold war negotiations and conversations.
But, like the gestation of elephants, it
all begins by the dark of night, and it
takes some time for anything to
happen.
In early 1988, Bonn showed little
sign of anything remarkably different
from standard cold war postures and
reactions. The Berlin Wall remained
malevolently intact, and watchtow-

ers, barbed wire, and killer dogs were
commonplace as borders and bordercrossing points continued to embody
the outward dimensions of divisive
confrontation and human tragedy.
The SNF and modernization debate
swirled on with no real prospects for
resolution despite seemingly endless
and frantic political attempts to solve
the problem with words. And yet
there was, in some quarters, the quiet
suspicion - or was it only hope? - that
something might be happening in the
closed world to the East. Sooner or
later, and as a result in part of the corrosive impact of the Helsinki
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe ( C SC E) on Soviet
thinking, some gesture might well be
made to the West, and especially to
Germany, perhaps in military terms,
but also, and more important, in a
humanitarian context: measures to
ease some of the restrictions on interGerman travel and family reunification, perhaps, or something similar.
It did not happen quite like that.
Although the elements - and especially the 'human dimension' elements were all increasingly present, it took a
little time for the final denouement to
take shape and gather momentum.
State visits, official visits, working
visits have all become so frequent in
our times that it is sometimes difficult
to assess their importance (if any) one
by one. But, in this particular period,
it was almost impossible to measure
the real significance of each before a
new one appeared on TV screens and
in headlines. In the autumn of 1988
the chancellor of West Germany,
Helmut Kohl, visited Moscow with a
supporting party of politicians, officials, and bankers that, gargantuan at
the time, could stand respectable
comparison in numbers with contemporary Team Canada travels. At the
United Nations a month later

Mikhail Gorbachev talked about
freedom of choice. In June 1989 he
visited Bonn in an atmosphere that
assured a place for the word `
Gorbymanid in the work of German
lexicographers. Meanwhile all sorts of
extraordinary things were happening
in eastern Europe that were difficult
to put into meaningful patterns but
that were nonetheless aspects of a
rapidly changing scene. By the early
autumn, Hungary opened its frontier
to permit East Germans to move to
the West; and the freedom trains
were not far behind. And then came
the death knell: Gorbachev's visit to

beach as the tide comes in. No one, least
of all the West Germans, for all their
theoretical and assumed intelligence
advantages in dealings with East
Germany, really knew what was happening in the East, so quickly were
events producing a political kaleidoscope of chaos. It was almost
universally assumed - because
anything else was hardly conceivable that something like the GDR would
continue to exist but in a more liberal
and humanized form.
It was also assumed that such a
residual state would facilitate
longterm reconciliation. The federal
government even produced a rough
blue-

East Berlin for a major celebration of
the founding of the German
Democratic Republic (GDR): the
speech in which he referred to the
dangers of being left behind must
have struck as much terror into the
hearts of the East German party faithful as it evoked incredulous joy in the
Federal Republic. Was the Soviet
Union actually abandoning the GDR?
No one could possibly have suspected
that we were about to witness the
inexorable disintegration of a nation
state (of sorts) like a sandcastle on the

A man waves to relatives on the other side of
the wall

print for a Vertragsgemeinschaft, a
community of agreements, by which
inter-German relations would be governed. It went nowhere because the
powerful wave engulfing East
Germany had already undermined
the foundations of the GDR on which
Eastern participation in this community of agreements was to have been
built. Some officials in Ottawa grumbled petulantly (the Canadian nation-
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his immediate advisers, such an argument was unthinkable: this was no
time for misguided socialist romanticism and historical nostalgia. It was
instead an opportunity - perhaps
fleeting - to achieve what Germans
had dreamed of since the end of the
war, a reunited homeland. And making it possible was a Soviet Union
itself in the throes of transformation.
If only to answer the painful debate
over short-range nuclear forces (SNF),
only a fool would forego such an
opportunity by adopting a go-slow
policy. Ever true to his training as a
historian, Kohl's single-minded
determination to move forward
without hesitation and without
wrestling with enormous philosophical doubts was probably the outstanding feature of the Bonn political
landscape for months.
What disappointed Kohl deeply
was the initial lack of spontaneous
enthusiasm among some of the Allies
for the prize he was grasping at so
vigorously. He must have asked himself why not everyone seemed to be
rejoicing at the prospect of an undivided Germany without the wall and
all it stood for. Reticence and handwringing in the face of what was
clearly inevitable seemed to Canada a
relations with what some saw as a new indeed a lot of other things as well poor substitute for policy, regardless
centre of authority or residual state was beginning to emerge with some
of how others may have assessed the
emerging in East Berlin. No longer clarity. Greatly to the surprise of those
risks. Was it even conceivable in the
would relations be conducted, as who admired Kohl's decisive determiminds of others more powerful than
many of the Allies, including Canada, nation to take the tide of history at its
we that there might be effective meaflood and to lead Germany on to forhad done, through their Warsaw
sures that could be orchestrated to
embassies as dual accreditations. The tune (or, in Kohl's view, to its destiny),
stop or deflect this headlong rush to
Icelandic ambassador to Bonn pre- there were voices in the public debate
satisfy the pent-up desires and frussented his credentials in East Berlin, that lamented the inevitable death of
trations of generations of Germans?
becoming the first NATO ambassador, the German 'socialist' tradition whose
Unification was going to happen.
probably the first diplomat of any heartland and homeland had been
Was it in the broader interest for this
stripe, and probably the last as well, to largely geographically congruent with
to occur against the efforts of
the GDR. A not insignificant group of
be concurrently accredited to two
Germany's postwar friends who had
German capitals from Bonn, in an Greens, writers, and intellectuals
always implicitly or explicitly enviironic reversal of the Hallstein asked whether an effort should not be
sioned a freely united Germany as a
made to prevent this. For Kohl and
Doctrine that had been in force in a
desirable (if realistically unattainal preoccupation with being 'consulted' was, as usual, alive and well) that
this, and indeed other forms of
Bonn's responses to the cyclonic
winds of change from the East, 'had
not been vetted by NATO.' It is probably safe to assume that not even all
interested officials in Bonn had been `
consulted' in many instances. But
what would ultimately remain of the
GDR was simply not grasped - nor
indeed at the beginning could it have
been.
Some members of NATO tried to
move quickly to establish diplomatic

long-ago world. Canada was preparing credentials, but the process was
abandoned when it became clear that
no one in East Berlin knew just who
the head of state was (or would be,
the next day), and the speaker of the
Volkskommer was not sure that she
was the proper public figure to preside at such a portentous diplomatic
happening. 'Let's wait and see.' And so
Canada was deprived of a distinction
achieved, so far as is known, by
Iceland alone.
In the midst of all this chaos, the
vision of a world without a GDR - and

In early 1988, Bonn showed little sign of
anything remarkably different from
standard cold war postures and reactions. The
Berlin Wall remained malevolently intact,
and watchtowers, barbed wire, and killer dogs
were commonplace as borders and bordercrossing points continued to embody the
outward dimensions of divisive confrontation
and human tragedy.
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able!) objective? A Germany reunited
without the blessing and active support of its major friends might have
been tempted to lapse into a sullen
and self-preoccupied mood, which
would have been the worst possible
outcome for all concerned. The
Germans were realistic in their assessments of the power factors involved
and knew how serious the
reservations in Paris and London
and to a lesser extent in Washington
were. But Canada's early and decisive
rejection of such a `go-slow' option
was noted in Bonn and publicly
appreciated by Kohl. In any event,
the Canadians were the first (or
among the first few) to welcome the
prospect of German unification
despite our own share of painful
memories.
But what to make of Margaret
Thatcher's apparently active hesitation? And above all, what of France,
supposedly Germany's most devoted
friend and partner as the 'engine' of a
united Europe? Bonn officials could
scarcely believe what they heard from
Paris. As the East German sandcastle
was in the final stages of being swept
away, senior officials at the Elysee
were exploring the possibility of an
official visit by President Francois
Mitterrand to 'the other half of
Germany' in response, they said, to
an invitation issued by Erich
Honecker many years ago. By then,
Honecker had disappeared from the
scene. After all the fine rhetoric and
all the planning for a new united
Europe based on a Franco-German
entente, the shattered Germans could
only conclude that the French still
believed in the aphorism of Francois
Mauriac: 'We love Germany so much
that we are glad there are two of
them.'
The office of one of Kohl's senior
advisers was dominated by an enormously enlarged black and white

photograph of Kohl and Mitterrand
holding hands at Verdun. A clever and
politically sensitive photographer had
captured the two leaders in sharp silhouette: an enormous Kohl and a
much smaller Mitterrand in an
attitude symbolizing permanent
friendship between the two
countries. A powerful visual image
and statement. When the
possibility of an East German
visit became known, this powerful
visual image and statement was
quickly put into storage with the
comment: 'They didn't really meant
it.' Perhaps for good and sufficient

fess, to join the ranks of the souvenir
hunters. I still derive pleasure from
the memory of the sight of 'a little old
lady' - always a special category of
Berliner - taking her own revenge on
this obscenity of a monument. She
had donned her woebegone,
old (probably pre-war), and
unfashionably short fur coat
and a pair of Adidas running
shoes of more modern vintage, and
marched defiantly up to the wall to
confront it boldly and to contribute to
its destruction vigorously with her
screwdriver and hammer, humming
quietly to herself some-

I still derive pleasure from the memory of the
sight of a little old lady' - always a special
category of Berliner - taking her own revenge on
this obscenity of a monument... contributing! to
its destruction vigorously with her
screwdriver and hammer, humming quietly
to herself something that sounded
remarkably like the Ride of the Valkyries
reason, the French were not in the
forefront of Germany's Allies in welcoming the scarcely believable political realities emerging beyond their
eastern frontier. And perhaps the attitudes of Britain and some other Allies
are also understandable, even if the
reasons were different. Mercifully the
shadows of ambiguity they cast across
the path of history were relatively
short-lived.
But there were no signs of ambiguity
in the attitudes of ordinary
Berliners. One cold morning in
November I visited the Wall just
behind the Reichstag, partly, I con

thing that sounded remarkably like
the Ride of the Valkyries. And on that
cold, bright morning, could anyone
with the slightest knowledge of the
unbelievable things that had been
happening have argued convincingly
that the notion of Briinnhilde and her
horse galloping triumphantly across
the German heavens was nothing
more than pure Wagnerian fantasy?

Provost, Trinity College, University of
Toronto. Mr. Delworth was Canada's
ambassador to the Federal Republic of
Germany from 1988 to 1992.
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COMMENTARY

The Kosovo War:
A long catalogue of losers
With 20/20 hindsight it is apparent that the actions of all parties involved in the
war in Kosovo have brought to the fore issues around humanitarianism, values,
and consistency. Will any lessons be learned?
BY LOUIS A. DELVOIE

I

t is not uncommon for wars to produce more losers than
winners, especially wars involving
civilian populations. This fact is,
however, often obscured in the midst
of the euphoria which usually marks
the end of a war. Last year's war over
Kosovo was no exception. With the
benefit of a bit of hindsight, it is now
possible to draw up a provisional list
of the losers, and that list is
distressingly long. It includes
international organizations, nation
states, and peoples, as well as
prospects for peace, security, and stability in Europe.
The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) won a military
victory over Serbia, but at great cost to
its image, reputation, and future
effectiveness as an instrument for
change in the European security environment. For the first fifty years of its
existence NATO had been able to portray itself quite accurately as a purely
defensive alliance, whose military arsenal would be employed solely to
defend one or more of its member
states against aggression. On the basis
of its historical record, the Alliance
32

B

T

H

could legitimately claim that it posed
a threat to no one, and thus blunt the
arguments of its opponents and critics
around the world. That all came to an
end with the Kosovo war. Whatever
its other misdeeds, Serbia had not
attacked nor threatened to attack any
member state of N A T O . However
noble its motives may have been, the
fact remains that NATO launched a war
of aggression against Serbia. This fact
cannot be obscured by the efforts of
NATO communique writers to
describe the war euphemistically as a `
non-Article 5 crisis response operation.' In launching the war, NATO
undermined, if it did not outright forfeit, its claim to be a purely defensive
alliance; in so doing it strengthened
the hand of its many critics and
detractors, especially in Russia.
Another institutional casualty of
the Kosovo war was the United
Nations (UN). Marginalized and sidelined in the diplomacy and negotiations leading up to the war, the UN
played no part in the decision to intervene militarily or in the conduct of
operations against Serbia. This gave

the lie to the hopes and pretensions
that in the post—cold war and
post—Gulf War environment the UN
would once again be able to play the
role assigned to it by its Charter in the
realm of international peace and security. The fact was that the UN Security
Council was paralysed by a standoff
totally reminiscent of the cold war:
the veto-wielding Western powers
versus the veto-wielding Eastern powers. The UN ended up with no role to
play, other than to help pick up the
pieces by aiding refugees and contributing to the reconstruction of
Kosovo. However unjustly, this reality served to reinforce the view that the
UN could be an effective actor only in
those conflicts that did not engage the
interests of the permanent members
of the Security Council.
A third institution whose credibility was undermined by the Kosovo war
was the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As
part of a ceasefire agreement concluded in October 1998, the government
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
had agreed to the deployment

throughout Kosovo of international
observers operating under the authority and direction of the OSCE. Known
as the Kosovo Verification Mission,
the 1300 observers worked tirelessly
to prevent outbreaks of violence, to
re-establish local ceasefires, to negotiate disengagements, and to provide
humanitarian assistance to the victims
on both sides of the conflict. Their
efforts were often highly successful,
and their very presence served to curb
the worst excesses, since it reminded
the belligerents that they were under
constant scrutiny by the international
community. The tasks of the Mission
came to abrupt end in late March
1999 when 19 (the NATO countries)
of the 54 member states of the OSCE
decided to launch military operations
against Serbia. The OSCE, out of concern for the safety of its personnel,

the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
and the exactions of the Serb security
forces against the population of the
province had produced hundreds of
dead and thousands of displaced persons. With the start of the NATO
bombing campaign those figures
rapidly escalated to thousands of dead
and hundreds of thousands of
refugees. Why the change? Leaving
aside the empirically unsustainable
proposition that a humane and moderate leadership in Belgrade, imbued
with moral scruples, had then had an
unexplained change of heart, the sudden intensification of the Serbian
campaign in Kosovo would seem
largely attributable to the removal of
external deterrents. One of those
deterrents was the presence of the
OSCE observers. Another was the
threat of NATO bombing. It is inherent

More serious in terms of the United States' role
in the world was the bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade. On the one hand, the
explanations given for the intelligence failures
behind this mistake were reminiscent of an
episode of the Keystone Cops.
ordered the observers to withdraw
from Kosovo. With their hasty, but
orderly, withdrawal, the civilians of
Kosovo lost the modicum of protection which their presence had provided, and the OSCE suffered a blow to its
reputation and credibility.
Of the peoples affected by the war,
none suffered more than the ethnic
Albanians of Kosovo, precisely the
people that NATO wanted to protect.
In the months immediately preceding
the war, the Serbian campaign against
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to the concept of a deterrent that once
it is actually used, it ceases to be a
deterrent. That proved to be the case
for NATO bombing in the Kosovo war;
once actually begun, it no longer
served as a restraint, instead it became a
signal to the Serb leadership to unleash
the full fury of their security forces on
the hapless Kosovars. Even with the
wholehearted support of the international community, it will take Kosovo
decades to recover from the trauma,
dislocation, and destruction of 1999.

Although obviously not as great as
that of the Kosovars, the suffering
endured by the people of Serbia was
nonetheless real and widespread. It
certainly extended well beyond the
families of the hundreds of Serbs killed
as part of the 'collateral damage' done
in the course of the NATO bombing
campaign. The systematic destruction
of Serbia's infrastructures and
communications networks had an
immediate impact on the lives of the
people in the form of food and water
shortages. In a longer-term
perspective,
the
bombing,
combined with a prolonged period of
economic sanctions, will have had the
effect of reversing much of the
economic progress which Serbia had
made during the second half of the
twentieth century. The cost of repairing the damage will be enormous, and
the process will take years, especially
since it seems most unlikely that
Serbia will benefit from any external
assistance so long as Slobodan
Milokvid remains in office.
The Kosovo war also presented a
major setback for two ambitions oft
proclaimed by Western leaders:
stability in the Balkans and a cooperative framework for security
in Europe. The war contributed to
instability rather than stability in the
Balkans as tens of thousands of
Kosovar refugees inundated poor and
poorly prepared neighbouring
countries, often rekindling old ethnic
tensions within and between states,
and as Greece's unease with the
whole N A T O operation became
progressively more palpable. On a
broader canvas, the war also set back
the prospects for creating a 'new
security architecture' for Europe in the
post—cold war era. Most observers and
analysts seem to agree that such a
scheme will require the full and wholehearted involvement and co-operation
of Russia, the continent's largest, most
populous, and militarily most power-

ful state. In attacking Serbia, one of
Russia's oldest allies, and in bypassing
the UN, NATO provoked widespread
anger and condemnation in Russia,
and not only among nationalists and
communists, who were already
incensed over NATO's eastward expansion to include Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic. Much time and
skilful diplomacy will be required to
mend fences and to get the Russian
government back into a frame of mind
where it is genuinely prepared to cooperate with the West in the development of a 'new security architecture'
for Europe (as opposed to securing
Russia's signature on some more or less
meaningful document by threatening
to withhold some credit or other from
the International Monetary Fund).
The stature and credibility of the
United States, as the world's one
remaining superpower, also suffered
as a result of the Kosovo war, particularly when measured against the highminded rhetoric from the Clinton
administration about war aims and its
proud boasts about American military
prowess. A few examples will illustrate the point. In its efforts to compensate for inept American and
European diplomacy in the run-up to
the war, and to further its endeavours
to demonize the Serbian leadership,
the American administration chose to
whitewash the Kosovo Liberation
Army, which only a few weeks earlier
had been regularly branded by the us
intelligence community as a terrorist
organization, heavily involved in the
narcotics trade to finance its operations. Another example was President
Clinton's public announcement early
on in the war that the United States
would not send ground troops to
Kosovo. Although probably necessary
to sustain domestic political support
for the war, this statement was widely
criticized for providing a measure of

reassurance to its Serbian adversaries
as to what to expect. At another level,
the statement was interpreted to mean
that the United States was prepared to
risk the lives of Serbs and Kosovars in
defence of its values and ideals, but did
not deem them sufficiently important
to risk the life of a single American GI.
(In a Canadian frame of reference, this
brings to mind the old saw about
Britain being willing to fight to the
last, the last Australian or Canadian
that is.)
More serious in terms of the United
States' role in the world was the
bombing of the Chinese embassy in
Belgrade. On the one hand, the
explanations given for the intelligence
failures behind this mistake were
reminiscent of an episode of the
Keystone Cops. They certainly did
not reflect well on the capabilities of a
superpower that expends tens of
billions of dollars on its intelligence
establishment each year. On the
other hand, the action itself put the
United States on the defensive in
its relations with China. This
could not help but adversely
affect the position and influence of
the United States in ongoing
discussions with China on the
protection of human rights and
intellectual property, trade liberalization, China's admission to the World
Trade Organization (wTO), and, most
importantly in the longer term, issues
relating to the status of Taiwan and
regional security in east Asia. The
bombing of the embassy was at the
very least a most unfortunate episode
in what seems likely to become the
most important and most difficult
bilateral relationship of the first half
of the twenty-first century.
Finally, by what they said and did
in the Kosovo war, the governments
of all of the major Western countries
left themselves wide open to the
charge of having double standards

when the Russians launched their
offensive in Chechnya at the end of
1999. Qualitatively there was little to
differentiate the destruction wrought
and the human rights abuses perpetrated by the Russian forces in
Chechnya from the actions of the
Serb forces in Kosovo. What was radically different was the response of
Western governments to the two situations; polite diplomatic admonitions
for the Russians, threats and bombardments for the Serbs. Realism, of
course, dictates that the West cannot
do unto a nuclear-armed Russia what
it did to a militarily weak rump state
in the Balkans. And yet, since the
actions against Serbia were largely justified on the basis of universally
applicable principles, the West's genuine adherence to those principles
inevitably becomes rather suspect
when they are put on the proverbial
back burner as soon as they collide
with harsh reality.
The debate over the Kosovo war
will no doubt continue for years to
come. There are many questions, to
which no definitive answers have yet
emerged, regarding the diplomacy
leading up to the war, the
legality/legitimacy of NATO's military
intervention, the conduct and effectiveness of the bombing campaign,
etc. But it may not be too early to
suggest that there are already some
lessons to be derived from the war,
lessons which Western governments
could usefully ponder in the formulation of their foreign policies and the
conduct of their diplomacy in the
years ahead.

Louis Delvoie is Senior Fellow,
Centre for International Relations,
Queen's University, Kingston,
Ontario.
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YOUTH PERSPECTIVES

Back to the Future:
What aspiring diplomats need to know
Every year the Public Service
Commission
Post-Secondary
Recruitment Campaign for government jobs introduces significant
changes without notice. The autumn
of 1999 was no exception. The affected candidates were those applying for
Foreign Service (Fs), Management/
Consular ( A s ) and Development
Officer (PM) positions.
Almost all candidates believed that
the changes were indeed 'new' when in
fact the campaign was - from the vantage point of one who has followed it
intimately for over twenty years - a `
back-to-the-future' exercise. A look at
how and why I arrive at that conclusion may help future test-takers - as
well as those they approach for advice.
Academic criteria

The shift to a Bachelor's degree only
for FS candidates surprised many.
Historically, however, this is the
norm, not the exception. From 1928
to 1992 a Bachelor's was the FS entry
ticket (though aspiring diplomats
often had advanced degrees, plus languages). The 1993 to 1998 interregnum, when either two degrees or one
degree plus an exotic foreign language
were mandatory, reflected two contextual issues: a buyer's market
approach by government which took
advantage of the situation in which
lots of people with multiple degrees
were chasing few jobs, and the federal
deficit which dictated a reduction in
the number of candidates to limit the
per head cost of processing them.
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Concerning PM eligibility criteria, the
proliferation of degree specialties
identified in 1999 simply verifies the
continuing confusion shown in
recruiting by the Canadian
International Development Agency.
For the record, AS academic criteria
changed only marginally.
An unpublicized purpose for lowering the FS entry bar was to combat
increasingly high attrition rates over
the past five years among officers
hired with advanced academic
degrees, specialized language skills,
and considerable real-life experience.
The government's presumption
underlying the change was that
younger, less highly educated people
would be happier with the FS job, its
potential and salary than those longer
in the tooth. In fact, the notion is misguided because abundant numbers of
older candidates still emerged and will
succeed in the competition. Foreign
Affairs interviewers traditionally
select the brightest, most mature, and
best-performing candidates for the
eligibility list. This often - though not
always - disadvantages those with little experience of any type, particularly
when they assume, incorrectly, that
their academic work is relevant to the
exams and interviews, and that they
need not prepare for a competition in
which, typically, only one and a half
to two per cent of candidates from
any level are successful.
One final, important note about
academic criteria. Despite what government literature and recruiters say

and perhaps PM candidates,
neither degrees nor scholarly achievements are relevant in selection for an
interview, a job, or for assignments
and promotion after hiring. First, test
scores (plus an affirmative action formula in some cases) and, then, interview performance determine hiring
success. It was always thus.
to FS, AS

Candidate Volume

The government's 1999 campaign
goal was to double the number of
candidates from last year in the FS, As
and PM groups. This meant about 8,
000 or more were expected to apply
for FS jobs, and about 3,000 to 4,
000 each for PM and As positions. The
method to get the volume increase was
to lower or broaden academic criteria,
as described above. The back-to-thefuture benchmark for setting
anticipated numbers: about 6,500
applied for FS jobs in 1 9 9 2 ,
when the criterion of a
Bachelor's degree only was last used.
Why the volume push? More people stepping up to the hiring plate
makes government work look attractive again and makes the Public
Service Commission look effective as
a recruiter in a time when the job
market for grads is hot. Also, the
higher the volume of candidates and
the broader the range of acceptable
academic disciplines, the greater the
likelihood of increased participation
by under-represented social groups,
which attempts to address diversity
concerns in government employment
statistics.

Test changes

The back-to-the-future movement was
evident in alterations to two of the
three tests in 1999 (the Written
Communication or WCT test remained
the same). The cognitive Graduate
Recruitment Test (GRT) required for FS,
AS, and PM candidates was tinkered
with as usual. In place of five types of
exercises in 80 questions, as in 1998,
the 'new' version had four types of
exercises in 55 questions, with a disproportionately small reduction in test
time. Not only were many of the questions the same as in 1998, several were
the same as in 1989 and years following when the Entry Level Officer
Selection Test (ELOST) was used.
Why the changes? Very few finished the long, more varied 1998
exam, and that caused cut-off scores
that were the lowest in recent memory, possibly ever. Higher scores, and
particularly higher passing scores
inevitable with a pool of 4,000 to
8,000 test takers (depending on career
stream), will be the result from the
1999 GRT.
As to the Foreign Service test
required for FS candidates only, it
underwent the biggest alteration. But
- again - it was not as radical as interpreted by uninformed test-takers. The
main change was that the old knowledge-type geopolitical and policy
questions were eliminated. (These
had been used in one form or another
- essay or multiple-choice or both since Lester Pearson was the first successful national test recruit in 1928.)
Instead, the 'new' Foreign Service
Written Simulation Test (FSWST) provided four detailed, heavily nuanced,
hypothetical situations that diplomats
could encounter and asked candidates
to respond, in point form, as to how
they would deal with the scenarios.
Though new to the exam, these
questions were fundamentally the

same as, and were graded similarily to,
the verbal situational and role-play
questions used for decades in the
Foreign Service interview. Also, they
resembled old 'judgement questions'
which accompanied the former FS
knowledge test in the 1970s and
1980s. Result? Plus ca change, plus ca
meme chose.
What prompted these changes?
Three things. Government recruiters
decided, arguably in the opinion of
many current and former diplomats,
that competency testing provides a
better indication of job aptitude than
knowledge testing for prospective FS
officers. Indeed, the government has
for years been downgrading the
importance of international geopolitical and policy knowledge in candidates' cumulative (cognitive/writing/Foreign Service) test score until in
1998 the FS exam was worth only 10
per cent of the final total.
A second reason for change alleged
that candidates from presumed nontraditional academic backgrounds for
the Foreign Service would have a better chance of passing. This is not so,
but another article would be needed
to demonstrate why. The third reason
for test changes was to prevent - horror of horrors - candidates from
`studying' for the exam. Nonetheless,
while ingestion of knowledge was not
possible, or necessary, to prepare for
the new exam, my analysis of interview reports and hiring results in the
past repeatedly proves that training on
how to approach the situational questions, sample answers, and evaluation
advice raises scores dramatically.
Conclusion

In 1999, the government probably
encountered more people from different and lower-level academic backgrounds who knew less about the tests
they were about to take than in recent

memory. As for candidates, more of
them were taken aback by the 'new'
eligibility criteria and tests sprung on
them with little notice and less background information than ever before.
For the benefit of those attracted to
FS, AS, or PM careers in next year's
Post-Secondary Campaign, a few
words of advice. All detailed questions
about tests should be directed not to
local government offices/spokespersons or to hastily assembled and badly
briefed campus information teams,
but rather to informed Ottawa-based
co-ordinators of the campaign at the
Public Service Commission and the
Foreign Affairs Department where
there is a modicum of institutional
memory about the process and how it
really works. Comments about the
tests and interviews by former diplomats and, occasionally, by faculty can
be helpful, but bear in mind that people will likely talk about their test
experience, which was long ago, far
away, and differently evaluated. On a
positive note, conferring with serving
and ex-diplomats or their family
members can help candidates understand the milieu they aspire to work in
once the arcane vicissitudes of the
exam, interview, eligibility, and hiring
process are successfully negotiated.

Barry Yeates, President, Foreign
Service Examination and Career
Counselling Inc. Mr. Yeates, a former
diplomat and senior university
administrator, provides preparatory
seminars and study materials to help
candidates across Canada and internationally prepare for the FS, AS, and
PM exams and interviews. Well over
200 of his clients serve in all branches
of the Foreign Service.
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The summer 2000 issue of International Journal

N A T I O N A L

which will be available from the CIIA in August, contains the following articles: Alex Macleod,
Stephane Roussel, and Andri van Mens,
'Hobson's choice? Does Canada have any options in
its defence and security relations with the United States?'; Xavier Furtado, 'Human security
and Asia's financial crisis: A critique of Canadian policy'; John Stanton, 'Canada and war
crimes: judgment at Tokyo'; Andrew Richter, "Strategic theoretical parasitism" reconsidered:
Canadian thinking nuclear weapons and strategy, 1950-63'; Peter M. Roberts, 'Discovering
Canada's international role in Russia's archives'; Rawdon Dalrymple, 'Indonesia in the balance'; Louis A. Delvoie, 'Canada and Italy: A steady state relationship'; Michael Szonyi, `
China: the years ahead'; Richard W. Pound, 'Performance-enhancing drugs in sport:
Response by the international sports community'; Paul Sharp, 'Time for American to join the
Commonwealth'; Aural Braun, 'The risks of selective Europeanization: Russia and eastern
Europe.' Enquires to fraser@ciia.org
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